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Evidence: A Functional Meaning
Lyman Ray Patterson*
I. INTRODUCTION
A trial always involves two basic problems-the problem of as-
certaining the truth of the matter in issue, and the problem of re-
solving a dispute. The former can be characterized as the probative
problem, arising from the problem of proving, and the latter as the
forensic problem, arising from the procedural problem of proving-in-a-
trial. The probative problem is a problem of evidence in that it is the
problem of using evidence to ascertain the truth by "the ratiocinative
process of continuous persuasion."' The forensic problem is a problem
of the admissibility of evidence, and it is the forensic problem which
has loomed largest in the field of evidence. The law of evidence
consists of "procedural rules devised by the law, and based on litigious
experience and tradition, to guard the tribunal (particularly the jury)
against erroneous persuasion."2
The unsatisfactory state of these procedural rules is no longer open
to question. Most would agree that, "The law of evidence is sagging
to the point of collapse under its own weight."3 Few would dispute
that much of the law of evidence is "archaic, paradoxical: and full of
compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to
one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other."4
A primary factor contributing to this condition seems to be that the
prominence of the forensic problem in the law of evidence has
obscured the importance of this probative problem.5 The reason for
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. WIGMom, TAE ScIENCE oF Junic_ AL PROOF (3d ed. 1937).
2. Ibid.
3. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAm. L. Bv. 277 (1952).
4. Mr. Justice Jackson in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
5. Wigmore in his Science of Judicial Proof recognized that the procedural rules
have "loomed largest in our formal studies-has, in fact, monopolized them," and that
this was error. "For one thing, there is, and there must be, a probative science-the
principles of proof-independent of the artificial rules of procedure; hence, it can be
and should be studied. . . .And, for another thing, the judicial rules of Admissibility
are destined to lessen in relative importance during the next period of development."
WiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3-4.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
this is not hard to see. The use of evidence in a trial presents problems
which are unique to the proceeding. A trial is an adversary proceeding
in which the trier of fact must resolve issues on the basis of the
evidence presented, and there must be some evidence offered before
it can be used. The preliminary problem is that of admitting evidence,
and the admission of evidence involves primarily procedural difficul-
ties peculiar to a trial. The task of resolving these difficulties is such
that it is easy to assume either that their solution is also the solution of
any probative problems that may exist, or that the solution of the
probative problem must give way to solutions of the forensic problems
demanded by the exigencies of a trial.
The genesis of this assumption is probably the fact that evidence
in the general sense differs from legal evidence, the former being
a matter of logical considerations, the latter a matter of logical and
forensic considerations combined with judicial experience.6 This is the
excuse for giving forensic considerations a higher priority. Under
this view, however, legal evidence is a system unto itself owing only
a secondary allegiance to logic. Legal evidence is then evidence only
because the rules say it is evidence. For some practical purposes,
this position may suffice; for analytical and critical purposes, it does
not provide a sound basis either for resolving problems of evidence or
evaluating the rules of evidence.
The word evidence is used in the law with different meanings, and
there is little point in saying that any of the meanings is wrong.
Words mean what they are used to mean, at least to the writer or
speaker, and the varied uses of the term merely indicates that evidence
is a thing of many aspects. The most common meaning given to
evidence seems to be, "that which tends to produce conviction in the
mind as to the existence of a fact,"7 or "all the means by which any
alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation,
is established or disproved."s Below this level of generality, the mean-
6. See State v. McFarland, 83 N.J.L. 474, 479, 83 A. 993, 997 (1912).
7. Evansville R.R. v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 560, 561 (1858). See also Ex parte Lam
Pui, 217 F. 456 (E.D.N.C. 1914); Knox County Feed & Hatchery, Inc. v. Ivers, 130
Ind. App. 481, 166 N.E.2d 132 (1960); Magazine v. Shull, 116 Ind. App. 79,
60 N.E.2d 611 (1945); Green Mountain Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 95 A.2d
679 (1953).
8. Application of Everts, 175 Neb. 310, 316, 121 N.W.2d 487, 490 (1963). See
also Tift v. Jones, 77 Ga. 181, 3 S.E. 399 (1887); Auditor General v. Menominee
County Sup'rs, 89 Mich. 552, 51 N.W. 483 (1891); McEntyre v. Tucker, 5 Misc. 228,
25 N.Y. Supp. 95, 96 (1893). Cf. UNIoma Rur.s OF EvmmrcE 1(1), the definition
in which defines "'evidence' [as] . . . the means from which inferences may be
drawn as a basis of proof in duly constituted judicial or fact-finding tribunals, and
includes testimony in the form of opinion, and hearsay." The Model Code does not
define evidence. The latest attempt at an authoritative definition appears to be that
of the California Law Revision Commission: "'Evidence' means testimony, writings,
material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove
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ings are varied. Despite this variation, little difficulty is encountered in
the practical use of the word, because evidence is a relative term, the
particular context of which usually makes clear the purpose for which
it is used.9 When we move beyond the particular situations involving
concrete problems to the general situations involving theoretical ones,
however, the variation in the particular meanings creates confusion,
and the general definitions are of little help. Yet, a satisfactory solution
to the concrete problems owes a larger debt than is usually acknowl-
edged to the satisfactory solution of theoretical problems.
The difference between concrete problems and theoretical problems
of evidence is one of degree, but significant degree; it is that of de-
termining whether certain evidence should be admitted in a particular
case, and whether a certain type of evidence should be admitted
generally. Theory is appropriate and necessary in both instances,
but it is indispensable in the latter. The general problems, however,
can never be satisfactorily resolved by theory alone, because the prob-
lems of using evidence are infinite in their variety. But the purpose
of theory in the law of evidence is not to provide an answer; the
purpose is to provide a means for obtaining a better answer. A
theory consists of fundamental ideas which are employed consistently,
and which serve as a basis for evaluating, relating, and using other
ideas in resolving problems in a given area. In a very real sense, it
is an analytic tool, though the tool is more an anvil than a hammer.
And the infinite variety of evidentiary problems which faces lawyers
and judges enhances its importance.
The most convenient starting point for treating theoretical problems
is a definition of evidence constructed for this purpose. The difference
between such a definition and the above definitions is the difference
the existence or nonexistence of a fact in judicial or factfinding tribunals." CAL. L.
REv. Comm., TENTATIVE RECOM2MNDATION An A STUny RELATING TO THE UNWoRM
RurEs OF EVIDENCE 8 (1964). Thayer defined evidence as follows: "Evidence, then,
is any matter of fact which is furnished to a legal tribunal otherwise than by reasoning,
as the basis of inference in ascertaining some other matter of fact." Thayer, Presump-
tions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARv. L. R v. 142, 143 (1889). Wigmore defined
evidence as: "Any knowable fact or group of facts, not a legal or a logical principle,
considered with a view to its being offered before a legal tribunal for the purpose of
producing a persuasion, positive or negative, on the part of the tribunal, as to the
truth of a proposition, not of law or of logic, on which the determination of the
tribunal is to be asked." 1 WIrMORE, EVIDENCE § l(c) (3d ed. 1940). For definitions
of other authorities, see 1 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra. Neither McCormick nor
Morgan define evidence in their respective works in the field. McCoRNcIK, EVIDENCE
(1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE (1963).
9. "Many text writers have accumulated innumerable attempts to define or -explain
what evidence is, each fitting the facts of a particular case or elucidating at length
the views of the author .... A review of all these authorities makes clear that evidence
is that probative material, legally received, by which the tribunal may be lawfully
persuaded of the truth or falsity of a fact in issue." People v. Leonard, 207 Cal.
App. 2d 409, 24 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600 (1962).
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between a descriptive meaning and a functional meaning. It is the
difference between saying that hearsay is rumor, gossip, mere specula-
tion, and saying that hearsay is an extrajudicial statement used to
prove the truth of the matter contained therein. Neither meaning
is better or worse; they are simply different. And because they are
different, one is more or less helpful than the other, depending upon
the purpose for which it is used.
Evidence takes many forms and a determination of what evidence is
for analytical purposes is primarily an effort to reduce evidence to its
lowest common denominator. The analysis required for this purpose
results in fundamental ideas which can be used as theoretical concepts
in resolving problems of evidence generally as suggested above. The
resulting definition, however, must itself be functional, and the prob-
lem is whether it should be related to the function of proving, or the
function of proving-in-a-trial. The answer here is that it must be
related to the former, without regard to the latter. This does not
mean that the function of proving-in-a-trial is not important, or that
it does not present real and difficult problems. It means only that
these problems are temporarily by-passed in order to fashion a tool
of analysis for dealing with them more effectively at a later day.
II. WHAT Is EVIDENCE?
To determine the functional meaning of evidence, three questions
must be answered: (1) Of what does evidence consist? (2) What
is the function of evidence? (3) What is the condition necessary for
fulfilling this function? The answers to these questions will explain
what is evidence, why we use evidence, and when we use evidence.
A. The What
The key to a determination of what evidence consists is the dis-
tinction between fact and proposition of fact.'0 The difference be-
tween a fact and a proposition of fact is the difference between a
rock and a statement about a rock. The rock is a fact, the statement
is a proposition of fact, and the point of difference is so obvious that
it suffers from its simplicity. Custom and usage have blurred the
distinction between fact and proposition of fact to the extent that
the terms are used interchangeably, and often indiscriminately,
causing many to fail to recognize that evidence consists not of facts,
but of propositions of fact."
10. See Michael & Adler, The Trial of An Issue of Fact, 34 CoLum. L. REV. 1224
(1934).
11. "While the term, evidence, is sometimes used as synonymous with the term,
facts, they are not really synonymous. Evidence, broadly defined, is the means from
[ VOL. 18
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Propositions of fact to which all evidence can be reduced, however,
are not necessarily propositions of actual fact. All propositions, as a
matter of form, are propositions of fact because the subject must be a
fact of some kind. Generally, the term proposition of fact is reserved
only for propositions which are correct. The statement, "Water boils at
112 degrees Farenheit," is a proposition, but it is not a proposition
of fact, as the phrase is commonly understood, because it is incorrect.
The proposition of fact is "Water boils at 212 degrees Farenheit,"
since the prepositional phrase "of fact" serves to distinguish true
propositions from false propositions.
For evidentiary purposes, proposition of fact takes on a quite dif-
ferent meaning. The prepositional phrase "of fact" should not indicate
the truth or falsity of the proposition, but only that the proposition
purports to be based on a fact of which the person making the
proposition purports to have knowledge. Thus, proposition of fact as
evidence means a proposition purportedly based on a fact.
This distinction helps to resolve the problem of whether an incorrect
proposition can be evidence. When evidence is defined as "Any
knowable fact or group of facts,"'2 the implication is that a false
fact, so to speak, is not evidence. For legal evidence, however, this
position will not withstand analysis. 13 The common law system of
evidence is an adversary system wherein a large portion of the
evidence in any given trial will almost inevitably be false for a
number of reasons. The perception, language, memory or sincerity
of the witnesses may be faulty singly or in various combinations.
The point is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, while all the
evidence in a trial relates to the same issues, the jury does not get
the case unless the evidence is in conflict. If the evidence is all
consistent, the judge will either dismiss the action, direct a verdict,
or by a similar procedural device dispose of the case without the
jury's aid.
Even though this is so of legal evidence, what of evidence generally,
i.e., evidence not used in an adversary proceeding? Is it proper to
say that a false proposition used by an individual in the process of
confirming or denying a proposed conclusion is evidence? The answer
is yes. If we view evidence as an end in itself, as something which is
correct and which justifies the conclusion, then it is difficult to see
how a false proposition can be evidence. But if we view evidence
as material used in the process of proving a proposition, as a means
to an end, then a false proposition can be evidence. The latter view
which an inference may logically be drawn as to the existence of a fact." Tjernstrom
v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Mich. 450, 454, 280 N.W. 823, 825 (1938).
12. 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1(c).
13. See State v. Howard, 162 La. 719, 111 So. 72 (1926).
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is the proper one. To say otherwise is to ignore the fact that what is
evidence is determined by use, not by a set of arbitrary rules. When-
ever propositions are used as the basis for a conclusion, they are
evidence, regardless of whether they are true or false. If the evidence
is false, of course, the conclusion will probably be false. We no longer
believe, for example, that the earth is the center of the universe as
the Ptolemaic theory suggests. But this does not mean that the
Ptolemaic theory was not based on evidence.
Evidence is a relative term, and for present purposes the important
point about propositions which constitute evidence is not that they
are true or false, but that they serve as the basis of a conclusion.
This explains why even though evidence consists of propositions, not
all propositions are evidence. We do not say of a proposition, "This
is evidence," but, "This is evidence of X," because a proposition is
not evidence unless it is related to a proposed conclusion.14 All pro-
positions, of course, can be evidence because they can be related to
a proposed conclusion; but we do not treat them as evidence until we
are interested in proving another proposition. Evidence, then, is
evidence only because it is used as evidence.
That a false proposition can be evidence is not as surprising as it
may first seem. Propositions reflect our perception of facts, and all
of us perceive individually, and thus differently. In a larger sense,
propositions simply express what we know, or think we know, or
presume to know about facts. When we do know, i.e., when the
proposition is true, there is no difficulty. When we think we know
or presume to know, we do not see any difficulty, and we will use
the resulting propositions as if they are correct. It is only when we
know that we do not know, i.e., when we know that a proposition is
false, that we cannot properly use the proposition as evidence.
To answer the question of what does evidence consist, then, we
can say that it consists of propositions purportedly based on fact.
B. The Why
Of the three questions, the what, the why, and the when, the answer
to the question why appears to be the easiest to state, for, obviously,
the function of evidence is to serve as a basis from which to confirm
or deny a definite proposition. Yet the answer to this question is the
most important of the three, and the most difficult to understand,
because an understanding of why requires an appreciation of the
relationship of evidence to proof.
14. "[E]vidence is always a relative term. Yet there is a constant in it, viz. the
relation between the proposition to be established and the material evidencing the
proposition." Kings County Lighting Co. v. Nixon, 268 Fed. 143, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
See also State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d '161 (1957).
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The first step in understanding this-relationship is to make a careful
distinction between what is evidence and what is proof. Evidence
is a proposition which is relevant to a proposed conclusion and tends
to justify the conclusion; proof, we say, is evidentiary propositions
which warrant the conclusion. Thus, proof is a body of evidence
sufficient to produce a conviction that the proposed conclusion is true
or false. However, to say this is not very helpful. In an actual case,
we are not so much interested in what is proof in general as in whether
"this evidence" is proof, and why "this evidence" may convince one
person but not another. If the evidence is to be called proof, then
what may be proof for one is not proof for another, and there are
many instances when this is so. In United States v. Ellicott,"5 a case
tried without a jury, the district judge found defendants guilty, and
the court of appeals split two to one in reversing on the ground that
the government had not proved its case. How can we explain that
the evidence became proof for two able and competent judges, but
remained evidence short of proof for two other equally able and
competent judges? To answer this question, it is necessary to look
to the process by which the conviction is produced.
To prove, as a verb of action, implies a process. The process may
involve one -person, or two or more persons. For example, in de-
termining whether to prosecute, a prosecutor proves to his own
satisfaction that "X" is guilty; but, under our system of justice, he
must then prove "X's" guilt for the jury. Thus, a person acting alone
may prove a proposition for himself, or one person may prove a propo-
sition to another. In the former instance, proving means an inferential
process; in the latter, proving means a demonstration or presentation
of evidence. Proving as a demonstration of evidence, however, is
basically a matter of form and this meaning of prove can be said
to be secondary. A trial, of course, always involves two or more
persons, and the importance of the lawyer's role in demonstrating
the evidence has given this meaning of prove a disproportionate
significance. As a result, in a legal context, we tend to think of
proving as consisting only of a presentation or demonstration of
evidence.
This meaning of prove, however, is of little aid in analyzing the
term proof and relating it to the meaning of evidence. It emphasizes
the importance of the role of the person who presents the evidence
and tends to obscure the whole purpose of presentation, which is
to produce a conviction in the mind of the person who receives the
evidence. The process of presenting the evidence obviously does not
of itself produce the conviction, because the recipient of the evidence
15. 336 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964).
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must understand it. Thus, the primary meaning of prove has to do
with the process in the mind of the recipient of the evidence. In
this primary sense, proving is a process of reasoning by the recipient,
or more particularly, the process of drawing inferences. Because this
process is essential to proving regardless of how many persons are
involved, it is most useful to think of proving as essentially an
inferential process. Although the form varies, the substance does not.
The fact that there are two different, yet complementary, meanings
of prove emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the
two. The difference between proving where only one person is
involved and where two or more persons are involved is that in the
former, the one person has both the tasks of gathering the evidence
and of making the necessary inferences; in the latter, the person
who is to make the necessary inferences has only that task, since the
evidence is assembled and presented to him by others. In the
primary meaning of the term, the one who proves is the one who
must make the inferences; in the secondary meaning of the term,
the one who proves is the one who demonstrates the evidence. The
former may be thought of as subjective proving and the later as
objective proving, but unless otherwise indicated, the term proving
is here used to mean proving in the subjective sense.
Since proving is essentially an inferential process, what produces
conviction in the mind of a person is not the evidence, but the
inferences drawn from the evidence. From this, it follows that proof
should not be thought of as consisting of the evidence, but of these
inferences. This explains why the same evidence may be "proof"
for one person and not another. With this understanding of proof
as inferences and evidence as propositions of fact, the following
scheme evolves: Fact-Proposition of Fact-Inference. Thus, a fact
(or supposed fact) is a basis of a proposition of fact, i.e., evidence, and
evidence is the basis of inference, i.e., proof.
Although an inference is a proposition derived from a proposition
of fact, the distinction between propositions of fact and inferences
serves a useful purpose for analysis. First, it shows the relation
between evidence and proof; second, this relationship explains why
that which we ordinarily call proof (evidence) may be called proof
for one, but not another; third, and most important, it emphasizes the
subjective aspect of proving, which is necessary if one is to define
evidence functionally. It means that the important person in the
process of proving is the recipient of the evidence. That the recipient
is the important person is indicated by the fact that he is the person
who is to be convinced, and if he is not convinced, the purpose of
the process for the person presenting the evidence is defeated.
[ VOL. 18
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The importance of the subjective aspect of proving, perhaps, can
be made clearer by analogizing the process of proving to the educa-
tional process. The purpose of proving is either to confirm or deny a
proposition, or to get another to confirm or deny a proposition. Thus,
proving to another involves both a teaching and a learning process.
To learn that a proposition is true or false is to enlarge one's knowledge
and, in a larger and more comprehensive sense, proving is a process
for enlarging one's knowledge either by oneself or with the aid of
another. Generally, because we think in terms of one person's proving
to another, we tend to think of proving as a process of teaching. We
say that X proved a proposition to Y in the same manner that we say
X taught Y to add and subtract. However, if proving is essentially a
reasoning process, the weakness of this view is that reasoning by its
very nature is subjective. One cannot reason for another anymore
than he can learn for another. It is this difficulty which suggests that
we should think of proving as primarily a learning, not a teaching
process.
To extend the teaching-learning analogy further, when we say that
X taught Y to add and subtract, we mean only that X demonstrated
to Y the principles and rules of subtraction and addition. We may
mean that X demonstrated the principles and rules in the sense that
we say X taught certain courses, without any intimation as to whether
Y understood the material presented. Or we may mean that X did
succeed in getting Y to understand the material, in which case we
mean that Y learned. Thus, when we say that X taught, we may
refer only to X's conduct merely, or we may refer to X's conduct as
being successful. However, the correctness of the statement in the
latter sense is determined not by X's teaching, but by Y's learning. If,
after X has demonstrated the principles and rules, Y can add and
subtract, we mean that X was successful in his teaching. If Y cannot
add and subtract, we mean that X attempted to teach Y. To illustrate
with another example. If X proves the Pythagorean theorem to Y, Y
may be convinced that it is true that the square of the hypotenuse
of a right triangle equals the sum of the squares of the other two
sides. But unless Y understands why and can prove this proposition
for himself, X has not actually proved anything to Y, because Y has
not learned.
The analogy to proving a proposition is complete, except for one
point. Proving a proposition to another is a teaching process in that
one presents material to be learned. But it is a special type of
teaching process in that its scope and aim are limited. Generally,
teaching is concerned with a subject. The subject may be as broad
as mathematics or history, or as narrow as driving a car or dancing.
1965 ]
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But in any case, a subject involves a series of related principles and
rules. Proving, on the other hand, is limited to determining the
correctness or falsity of a definite proposition. The point of difference
is that for teaching to be successful, the one who is taught must
understand the principles and rules. For proving to be successful, we
assume that the only thing necessary is that the person to whom the
evidence is presented be convinced of the correctness of the proposi-
tion in issue. Learning is the aim of teaching, persuasion, we assume,
is the only aim of proving.
Proving in the objective sense may be thought of as a type of
persuasion, but it is persuasion which, for its effectiveness, is depend-
ent upon the reasoning of the person to whom the evidence is offered.
If persuasion alone is the aim of demonstrating the evidence, then
it is not true that proving is a matter of learning, for the success of
proving then is measured by whether the recipient of the evidence
is convinced of the proposition in issue. But there is a distinction
between proving a proposition and persuading another of the correct-
ness of a proposition, and the real test of one's success in demon-
strating the evidence is the same as that of one's success in teaching-
understanding by the person to whom the evidence is presented.
The point which obscures proving as essentially a process of learn-
ing is that when we think of learning we think in terms of acquiring
information, rules and principles which can be used generally. When
we think of proving, at least in a legal context, we do not think in
terms of acquiring information, but simply in terms of whether a
proposed conclusion is right or wrong. Once the determination is
made, there may or may not be any further use for the conclusion,
depending upon the type of proposition being proved. Insofar as
proving in a legal trial is concerned, the utility of the conclusion is
limited to the purposes of the trial. But this should not be allowed
to obscure the point that the essential aspect of the process of proving
in a legal trial is the inferential process just as in the matter of proving
generally.
It is because proving is essentially a process of learning, i.e., a matter
of inferences, that what is proof for one may not be proof for another.
This point makes clear the relationship of evidence to proof. Evidence
is simply the information used in proving a proposition. Whether the
evidence is treated as proof is determined not by the person presenting
the evidence, but by the recipient of the evidence, as in the Ellicott
case discussed above. Thus, when we say that evidence serves as a
basis, from which to confirm or deny a proposition, it is important to
realize that a meaningful confirmation or denial can be made only
by the person to whom the evidence is presented.
[ VOL,. 18
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With this understanding, we can add the why portion of our
definition to the what. Evidence is a proposition purportedly derived
from a fact and used as a basis of inference for confirming or denying
another proposition.
C. The When
When do we use evidence? If X wishes to persuade Y of the truth
of the proposition, "The coat is red," he can do one of two things.
He can show the coat to Y, or he can offer evidence of the correctness
of the proposition to Y in order that Y might prove the proposition
himself. If X shows the coat to Y, there is no need for him to offer
evidence that the coat is red, because Y, assuming that he has normal
vision, can see for himself. If Y cannot see the coat, X must offer
evidence, and the only evidence he can offer is the proposition, "The
coat is red." He may offer this proposition in as many forms as he
wishes and by as many witnesses as he wishes, but they will all amount
to an assertion that the coat is red and nothing else.
If Y sees the coat, he cannot avoid the conclusion that the coat
is red. If he receives only evidence of the conclusion, no matter what
the weight or amount of the evidence, he can avoid the conclusion
that the coat is red. The former instance involves direct perception
and the latter requires that he prove. The point is that if Y directly
perceives that the coat is red, he will not prove the proposition. When
one perceives a fact, this perception will result in a proposition. If
he seeks to prove this proposition, the proposition which he seeks to
prove will be the same proposition that resulted from perception.
Since the proposition which is a result of direct perception is also
the evidence, he will be using a proposition to prove itself. Thus,
if Y sees that the coat is red, the proposition he will seek to prove is:
"The coat is red." His evidence will be: "The coat is red." His proof
will be the inference: "The coat is red." His conclusion will be:
"The coat is red." The starting point of the proving is the same as
the finishing point and the conclusion is not based on reasoning at all,
but on sensory perception.
This example suggests that we use evidence only when the fact
which is the basis of the proposition to be proved is one which is not
directly perceived by the person who is to prove the proposition in
the subjective sense. The point is fairly obvious when we are dealing
with a fact such as color. This is because color is a fact which can
be identified only descriptively, i.e., it is identified only by a char-
acteristic which can be perceived through one of the five senses. In
contrast to this type of fact, however, most facts are capable of
identification not only descriptively, or on the basis of form, but also
operatively, or on the basis of content or function. For example, salt
1965]
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is a substance which can be identified by direct perception, i.e., by
taste. But whether a particular substance is or is not salt can also be
determined by chemical analysis, because salt is a substance of a
particular chemical composition. The problem here is whether the
condition stated above-that the condition for the use of evidence is
that the fact which is the basis of the proposition to be proved will be
one not directly perceived by the person who is to prove the proposi-
tion-is true for facts which are capable of identification operatively
as well as descriptively.
The first point which must be clarified is that the condition applies
only to the person who is to prove, i.e., who is to engage in the
necessary inferences to reach the desired conclusion. This is clear
when one seeks to prove without the aid of another, but it should
be remembered that when X offers evidence to Y, the condition refers
to Y and not to X. This is important because although one does not
prove a proposition based on a fact he directly perceives, the proposi-
tions which constitute evidence are, by and large, the result of direct
perception. Even though one who directly perceives that the coat is
red does not prove this proposition, he can offer this proposition to
another as evidence to enable the other to prove.
The condition for the use of evidence stated above is based on the
distinction between acquiring knowledge by direct perception and
acquiring knowledge by proving. These two means of acquiring
knowledge are complementary, but they are not interchangeable.
Direct perception is a means of acquiring knowledge through the use
of one or more of the five senses. Proving is the acquisition of knowl-
edge by a reasoning process. One perceives a fact, and one proves a
proposition.
The acquisition of any knowledge requires perception. One must
be able to perceive words before he can read. However, it is only
when the perception requires no reasoning at all that knowledge
results from direct perception. Whenever reasoning is required, the
knowledge cannot be said to result from direct perception.
The point of difficulty here is that there are some instances where
a proposition resulting from direct perception is seemingly proved by
the person perceiving the fact. This difficulty, however, disappears
when one realizes that the proposition which is proved is not actually
a proposition resulting from direct perception, but only appears to be.
For example, consider the proposition, "This substance is salt." A
taste of the substance will convince most persons that the substance
is salt, and the proposition they will derive from their direct percep-
tion will be: "This substance is salt." But the only proposition which
can properly be derived from the taste of the substance is: "This
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substance tastes like salt." The substance may be a salt substitute,
in all sensory aspects similar to salt. The only way to prove that the
substance is salt is by chemical analysis, and the chemical structure
of the substance is not subject to direct perception. Thus, the condi-
tion for the use of evidence prevails even though the fact which is
the basis of the proposition exists on more than one level, because
in such instances, the proposition proved never results from direct
perception.
The same reasoning applies when the fact which is the basis of
the proposition is an act, but with some qualification. If the proposi-
tion is derived from a single act, and is limited to the single act, there
is no difficulty. However, most propositions which supposedly result
from direct perception of an act are not based on a single act, but on
several acts. Thus, if Y sees A shoot B, the proposition which results
is that A shot B. The proposition, however, is not derived from a
single act, but from the observation by Y of a series of acts. Even
though each of these acts is directly perceived by Y, he may still
prove that A shot B, because the conclusion is based on a series of
propositions, all being derived from different acts, which must be
related to each other and to the proposed conclusion.
To complete the definition of evidence, then, we can say: Evidence
is a proposition purportedly based on a fact and used as a basis of
inference for confirming or denying a proposition based on a fact
not directly perceived.
III. AN ANALYsIs
The above definition is based on three factors: (1) All evidence
can be reduced to propositions. (2) Proving requires the applica-
tion of an inferential process on the part of the person to whom the
evidence is presented. (3) This inferential process is not necessary
to prove a proposition based on a fact one perceives directly. Each
of the factors is well recognized, but they are seldom brought together
in a definition. The reason for combining them is that they are
fundamental and constant, and together they provide a basis for
analyzing problems of evidence with a precision not usually accorded
them. The use of the three factors and their relation to each other
can be made clearer by a brief summary of the process of proving-
in-a-trial.
The process of proving-in-a-trial has two major aspects, the process
of presenting the evidence, or the objective aspect, and the process
of inference to be made by the trier of fact, the subjective aspect.
Both the objective and the subjective processes in turn have two
aspects. The objective process involves the presentation of the
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evidence by the proponents and the ruling on the admission or
exclusion of proffered-items of evidence by the judge. The proponents
of the evidence are guided by the rules in presenting their evidence,
and the judge relies on the rules in determining whether proffered
items to which objection is made shall be admitted or excluded. The
two aspects of the subjective process in the trial of a case are
reliability and inference. The jury determines the reliability of the
evidence and draws inferences therefrom. Although the rules of
evidence are not usually thought of as related to the subjective aspects
of proving, there is in fact a close relationship, for the whole function
of the trial is directed to this concluding point.
The exclusionary rules of evidence based on the policy of ascer-
taining the truth are generally thought of as being procedural in
that they are used as procedural guides in determining the admis-
sibility of evidence. This view, however, is engendered largely by the
objective process of proving. If we view the exclusionary rules from
the standpoint of the subjective process of reliability and inference,
it appears that most of them are directed primarily to the problem
of reliability, although some are clearly designed to prevent the jury
from making erroneous inferences. Such, for example, is the rule
excluding evidence of other crimes against a defendant in a criminal
case. The prime example of an exclusionary rule directed to relia-
bility appears to be the hearsay rule. Analysis, however, reveals
that the hearsay rule is directed as much to the inferential aspect as
to the reliability aspect of proving, if not more so. The rule of
admissions, an exception to the hearsay rule, illustrates the point. An
analysis of the rule of admissions, although here necessarily condensed,
shows that the function it fulfills is much more than a procedural
one serving as a guide for determining that a certain kind of evidence
is not excludable. The rule of admissions, in fact, fulfills a probative
function.
An admission is a statement made out of court by a party opponent
receivable in evidence when offered against him.16 In analyzing the
probative effect of an admission, it is necessary to determine the
propositions of which an admission consists and then to determine
what type of evidence these propositions constitute, i.e., direct or
circumstantial, as discussed below.. Evidence of a personal admission
always takes the form, "Defendant (or Plaintiff) said X," where
X is the proposition to the proved. There are actually two propositions
here, "Defendant said X," and the proposition represented by X.
And for the purpose of proving X, as in a negligence action in which
X is alleged, there are two possible probative propositions, "Defendant
16. 4 WirMoaE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1048.
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said X," and "X', one contained in the other. Where X is not a
proposition to be proved, as in an action for defamation in which
X is not alleged, the only probative proposition for purposes of
admissibility will be, "Defendant said X," because the proposed
conclusion will be, "Defendant said X." It may be that X is true and
truth is a good defense, but this is a matter for the defendant
to prove after it has been shown that he said X.
The problem becomes more complicated in determining the type
of evidence an admission is because of its double proposition form.
There are two types of evidence predicated on the basis of function.
Functionally, the proposition which is evidence must be related to
the proposed conclusion, and it is apparent that it will be related in
one of two ways. The proposition will be either consistent with the
proposed conclusion and no other, or it will be consistent with the
proposed conclusion but not inconsistent with other conclusion.
Propositions which are consistent only with the proposed conclusion
will be called direct evidence; propositions which are consistent with
the proposed conclusion, but not inconsistent with other conclusion
will be called circumstantial evidence. While these meanings of direct
and circumstantial evidence may at first appear to be contrary to the
traditional meanings of the terms, this is not so. Traditionally, direct
evidence is testimony and the term direct means that the testimony
must be the result of the witness' direct knowledge. However, since
all testimony of a witness must be the result of his direct knowledge,
circumstantial evidence, which is simply evidence of circumstances
within his knowledge, is also direct evidence of a sort under the
traditional meaning. To make a useful distinction between direct
evidence and circumstantial evidence, it is necessary to distinguish
them on the basis of their relationship as propositions to the proposed
conclusion, and doing this explains more than it changes the tradi-
tional meaning. To say (1) that direct evidence is consistent only
with the proposed conclusion and (2) that circumstantial evidence
is consistent with the proposed conclusion, but not inconsistent with
other conclusions limits the traditional meaning of direct evidence,
and states in another way the traditional meaning of circumstantial
evidence. This becomes obvious when one realizes that evidence
of circumstances, i.e., circumstantial evidence, under the traditional
definition is always a proposition consistent with the proposed con-
clusion, but not inconsistent with other conclusions.
Using the above analysis, assume, as in Janus v. Atskin,17 that the
proposed conclusion is X, representing the proposition, "Defendant's
dog knocked the old lady down." The evidence as presented by the
17. 9 N.H. 373, 20 A.2d 552 (1941).
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witness is, "Defendant said his dog knocked the old lady down."
The witness' testimony includes both a proposition as to the making
of the statement and the statement itself. But what is the evidence
-that the defendant made the statement, or the statement? Which it
is determines the type of evidence an admission is. If the evidence
is the statement of the witness, "Defendant said his dog knocked the
old lady down," it is circumstantial evidence, because it is not incon-
sistent with conclusions other than the proposed conclusions, which
is that the defendant's dog knocked the old lady down. If the
evidence is the statement of defendant only, it is direct evidence,
because it is consistent only with the proposed conclusion. The
position here is that the evidence is the statement of the witness, and
that an admission is a proposition of circumstantial evidence contain-
ing a proposition of direct evidence.
That an admission is circumstantial evidence containing a proposi-
tion of direct evidence shows why the rule of admissions is more
than a rule of procedure and in fact functions as a rule of proof. An
admission is sufficient to support a verdict only because the proposi-
tion X, the statement of defendant, is deemed to be direct evidence,
i.e., consistent only with the proposed conclusion. However, to use
the proposition, "Defendant said X" as the basis for inferring that X
did occur, it is necessary only for the jury to determine the reliability
of the proposition that defendant said X, and not the reliability of the
proposition X. If the plaintiff produces reliable evidence that de-
fendant said X, regardless of what evidence defendant introduces to
contradict X, the jury will be justified in returning a verdict for
plaintiff on the basis of the evidence, "Defendant said X."18 Thus, it
seems justified to say that the rule of admissions is a rule of proof,
rather than merely a rule of procedure, because it permits a conclusion
which need not, as a matter of law, be the result of proper inferences.
And what is true of admissions is also true of other exceptions to
the hearsay rule, such as declarations against interest and dying
declarations.
That the rule of admissions is a rule of proof becomes readily
apparent when we remember that hearsay is generally excluded
because it takes the form, "A said X," where X is the proposition to
be proved. Although it is generally said that hearsay is excluded
because it is unreliable, the bedrock reason for excluding hearsay
that analysis brings forth is that the jury may use the evidence as
the basis for erroneous inferences. If the proposed conclusion is X
and the evidence is "A said X," the witness on the stand is available




reliability of this testimony than it is to determine the reliability of
any other testimony. However, if the evidence is admitted and the
jury determines that "A said X," the jury has a proposition of circum-
stantial evidence containing a proposition of direct evidence. The
danger, of course, is that the jury will use the proposition of direct
evidence as the basis of a direct inference that X occurred.
To view the rule of admissions as a rule of proof and to see the
hearsay rule as one directed to the process of inference is to have a
better understanding of these rules. The better undrstanding does
not tell us whether the rules are good or bad, because this is a matter
of judgment which analysis does not perform. Analysis only enables
one to make better informed judgments on the basis of a more com-
plete understanding of the problems involved.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis necessarily goes beyond the proposed defi-
nition of evidence, but the definition is the starting point. In a
similar manner, it is believed, the definition can be used for over-
coming a primary obstacle in dealing with problems of evidence
generally-the infinite variety and source of the content of propositions
which constitute evidence, by providing the basis for a meaningful
framework for the analysis of evidentiary problems. Some aspects of
the framework have been briefly discussed to make the definition and
the point of the analysis clear. Later articles, dealing with the proof,
the types of evidence, and the relationship of evidence to rules of
evidence, will, it is hoped, develop these points in detail.
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